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INTRODUCTION
ourts rely heavily on expert opinions on technical issues
arising throughout civil litigation when knowledge about
complex science is beyond the capacity of the judges.
1
In com-
mon law jurisdictions, with their adversarial traditions, it is
common practice for parties to call their own experts to sepa-
rately provide expert opinions to the court.
2
This party-solicited
expert testimony has been criticized for its inherent vulnerabil-
ity to selection bias
3
and adversarial bias.
4
This is why the
1. Tal Golan, Revisiting the History of Scientific Expert Testimony, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 879, 881 (2008).
2. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 823, 835²36 (1985); John Basten, The Court Expert in Civil Tri-
als - A Comparative Appraisal, 40 MOD. L. REV. 174, 176 (1977); see also
Golan, supra note 1, at 887.
3. Paul Michell & Renu Mandhane, The Uncertain Duty of the Expert
Witness, 42 ALTA. L. REV. 635, 646 (2005).
4. David E Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Par-
tial) Failure of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 453 (2008). To
mitigate the problems of selection bias and adversarial bias, the alternative
to partisan expert testimony has been introduced to common law jurisdic-
tions, such as “court-appointed expert witness” established by Rule 706 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence of the United States, and “concurrent evidence”
adopted in Australian civil procedure, see Basten, supra note 2, at 181; Gary
Edmond, Merton and the Hot Tub: Scientific Conventions and Expert Evi-
dence in Australian Civil Procedure, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 162
(2009). However, empirical studies found that court-appointed experts were
used infrequently in the United States, see Langbein, supra note 2, at 840²
C
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“battle of the experts” often happens in the courtroom.
5
The
courts are supposed to filter out problematic expert testimony
that fails to meet the test of relevance and reliability, although
the standard of admissibility for expert testimony varies be-
tween jurisdictions.
6
However, it is difficult for lay judges to
evaluate partisan expert testimony as to scientific reliability
and scientific merit, which might lead to the use of junk science
by judges in delivering their judgment.
7
By contrast, civil law jurisdictions follow an inquisitorial sys-
tem where courts appoint disinterested and neutral experts to
provide expert opinions on technical issues.
8
On the one hand,
the court-appointed expert testimony may mitigate the prob-
lems of selection bias and adversarial bias associated with par-
tisan experts.
9
On the other hand, because most judges lack the
knowledge and experience to evaluate the scientific reliability
and scientific merit of expert testimony, they are more inclined
to accept it and show great deference to experts. With the high
rate of acceptance of expert opinions, court-appointed experts
may become the de facto decision-makers in determining con-
tested technical issues.
10
41; Anthony Champagne, Daniel W. Shuman & Elizabeth Whitaker, The
Problem with Empirical Examination of the Use of Court-appointed Experts:
A Report of Non-findings, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 361, 364²65 (1996).
5. The “battle of the experts” refers to a medical-legal phenomenon where
conflicting or contradictory expert testimony is presented in court because the
litigants, when required to provide expert opinions in the proceeding, usually
call expert witnesses who present testimony in favor of the calling party, see
generally Larry W Myers, The Battle of the Experts: A New Approach to an
Old Problem in Medical Testimony, 44 NEB. L. REV. 539 (1965).
6. Andrew W Jurs, Balancing Legal Process with Scientific Expertise:
Expert Witness Methodology in Five Nations and Suggestions for Reform of
Post-Daubert U.S. Reliability Determinations, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1329, 1348,
1365, 1373²74 (2012).
7. Henry Berry, The Medical Expert, Junk Reasoning, and Junk Science
in Personal Injury Litigation, 44 TORT TRIAL INS. PRAC. L. J. 1101, 1101, 1113,
1116²19 (2005).
8. Expert opinions are required in court to assist judges in determining
technical issues concerning special knowledge and skills that are beyond
their capacity. Technical issues vary in different types of cases, such as car
accident, product liability, work-related accident, and professional negligence,
etc. In medical negligence lawsuits, technical issues are normally medical
issues concerning medical science and clinical experiences and skills.
9. Langbein, supra note 2, at 836-40.
10. Jurs, supra note 6, at 1389.
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Chinese civil procedure is an inquisitorial system
11
and fol-
lows a hybrid approach to employing experts to assist judges in
civil litigation by using civil law court-appointed experts sup-
plemented by common law style party-solicited experts. Specif-
ically, an expert who provides expert opinions to assist judges
in deciding a case is called an “authenticator.”
12
The process of
making expert opinions is called “authentication,”
13
which can
be unilaterally or jointly initiated by the parties, or can be ini-
tiated by the court according to Article 76 of Civil Procedure
Law of People’s Republic of China.
14
In court-initiated authen-
tication cases, the court normally selects a court-appointed ex-
pert either based on the consensus of the parties or its own de-
cision if the parties’ joint selection fails.
Authenticators decide the contested technical issues by con-
sidering the available case materials and statements of the
parties or the witnesses.
15
An authenticator must accept cross-
examination when one party disagrees with their expert opin-
ions or when the court thinks it necessary; otherwise, the ex-
pert opinions should not be admitted.
16
To supplement the ex-
pert opinions of authenticators, the parties may apply to the
court to invite one or two partisan experts to question the au-
thenticators on behalf of the party or provide additional opin-
ions on technical issues.
17
The court has the power to question
partisan experts, as do the parties, provided that the court ap-
proves. Either party may apply to the court for re-
authentication when it does not accept the expert opinions of
the authenticators. The court will give leave if the party has
evidenced a statutory ground for re-authentication according to
Article 27 of Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on
11. Mo Zhang, International Civil Litigation in China: A Practical Analy-
sis of the Chinese Judicial System, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 59, 71
(2002).
12. Jianding ren (鉴定人) [Authenticator].
13. Jianding (鉴定) [Authentication].
14. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国民事
诉讼法) [Civil Procedure Law of People’s Republic of China], (promulgated by
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991 amend. 2007, 2012,
2017), [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law].
15. See Civil Procedure Law, art. 77.
16. See id., art. 78.
17. Id., art. 79.
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Evidence in Civil Procedures (“Provisions on Evidence in Civil
Procedures”).
18
Medical disputes have caused serious social conflicts and in-
stability in China.
19
Litigation works as the last resort to help
the patient-victims of adverse medical accidents who seek legal
remedies. It was reported that the number of medical negli-
gence lawsuits was 8,854 in 2004, and increased to 21,480 in
2016.
20
On average, this number is increasing by more than 8%
every year.
21
Because it is common and important for judges to
rely on expert opinions in determining medical negligence cas-
es, this article addresses the nature of the operation and role of
expert opinions in Chinese medical negligence litigation. This
article draws on content analysis of the “documents of adjudi-
cation decisions”
22
(DAD) of 3,619 medical negligence cases and
an in-depth survey of judges with experience in adjudicating
medical negligence cases. This empirical study offers three ma-
jor findings: first, that both parties to medical negligence dis-
putes show significant selection bias towards medical opinions,
as do courts when selecting court-appointed experts; second,
expert opinions in medical negligence litigation demonstrate
substantial adversarial bias; and third, courts display very
strong judicial deference to expert opinions in determining
medical negligence liability. This article further analyzes the
social, legal, and institutional factors that contribute to selec-
18. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Minshi Susong Zhengju De Ruogan
Guiding (最高人民法院关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定) [Some Provisions of the
Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil Procedures] (promulgated by
Supreme People’s Court, Dec. 21, 2001, effective Apr. 1, 2002, [hereinafter
Provisions on Evidence in Civil Procedures].
19. Benjamin L Liebman, Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in
China, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 183²84 (2013); Chunyan Ding, A Dose to
Cure “Medical Chaos”: Medical Mediation in China, 10 J. COMP. L. 158, 158²
59 (2015).
20. Zhongguo Yiliao Jiufen An Shinian Fanbei (中国医疗纠纷案十年翻倍)
[The Number of Medical Negligence Lawsuits Doubted within One Decade],
SUOHU XINWEN (SOHU NEWS) (Oct. 29, 2018),
http://www.sohu.com/a/271907448_129883.
21. Id.
22. Caipan Wenshu (裁判文书) [Documents of adjudication decisions]. In
China, documents of adjudication decisions consist of two types: one is judg-
ment that contains judicial decisions on substantive issues, and the other is
ruling that contains judicial decisions on procedural issues. This study inves-
tigates judgments of medical negligence cases.
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tion bias, adversarial bias, and judicial deference to expert
opinions in the Chinese medical negligence litigation setting.
This article fills the methodological gap left by the existing
literature because there has been no empirical discussion on
expert opinions in Chinese civil litigation to date. It provides
empirical evidence to verify selection bias and adversarial bias,
as well as judicial deference to expert opinions in Chinese med-
ical negligence litigation. Moreover, in October 2018, the Na-
tional Health Commission and the Ministry of Justice jointly
published the draft Regulatory Measures on Medical Negligence
Authentication (For Public Consultation).
23
This article there-
fore has important implications for the ongoing reform of the
medical negligence authentication mechanism proposed by the
Chinese government.
This article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief intro-
duction of a special mechanism through which expert opinions
are produced and presented in Chinese medical negligence liti-
gation. Part II focuses on the issues of selection bias, adversar-
ial bias, and judicial deference to expert opinions arising from
Chinese medical negligence litigation and formulates hypothe-
ses concerning these three issues. Part III explains the data
and research methods used in this study. Part IV presents the
research findings and tests the hypotheses. Part V discusses
the results of the research and analyzes the social, legal, and
institutional factors that contribute to selection bias, adversar-
ial bias, and judicial deference to expert opinions in the Chi-
nese medical negligence litigation setting. The conclusion
summarizes the article’s main contributions and their implica-
tions.
I. MEDICALNEGLIGENCE AUTHENTICATIONMECHANISM IN
CHINA
Before focusing on the discussion of selection bias, adversari-
al bias, and judicial deference to expert opinions in Chinese
23. Yiliao Sunhai Jianding Guanli Banfa (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) (医疗损害
鉴定管理办法(征求意见稿)) [Regulatory Measures on Medical Negligence Au-
thentication (For Public Consultation)], see Notice of the National Health
Commission and the Ministry of Justice on Public Consultation of the
Regulatory Measures on Medical Negligence Authentication, NAT’L HEALTH
COMM’N (2018),
http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/wjw/yjzj/201810/9fbd70bf42d74c96afb8bb77b3d7e25f
.shtml.
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medical negligence litigation, this part of the article explains
how expert opinions are produced and presented in Chinese
courts through a special mechanism called “medical negligence
authentication.”
24
It will also detail the special importance of
this mechanism for medical negligence lawsuits, as well as the
unique features of the mechanism.
A. Overview of Medical Negligence Authentication Mechanism
Current Chinese medical negligence law derives from two
sources of law. One is chapter seven (titled “Liability for injury
in medical care”) of Tort Liability Law of People’s Republic of
China (“Tort Liability Law”).
25
The other source is Interpreta-
tions of the Supreme People’s Court regarding Problems in De-
termining Compensation for Medical Negligence Cases (“SPC
Interpretations on Medical Negligence Liability”).
26
Under
Chinese law, medical negligence liability arises where a patient
sustains any harm during diagnosis and treatment due to the
fault of a medical institution or any of its medical staff.
27
To
claim medical negligence liability, the plaintiff-patient has a
burden of proof for personal injury, fault of the medical care
provider, and causation between the fault and the damage.
28
The defendant²medical care provider bears a burden of proof
when it argues no or less medical negligence liability in three
situations: (1) non-breach in the case of emergency, (2) non-
breach due to the state of medical knowledge at the time of ac-
cident, and (3) contributory negligence.
29
Both disputing par-
ties rely heavily on medical opinions in discharging their bur-
24. Yiliao Sunhai Jianding (医疗损害鉴定) [Medical negligence authentica-
tion].
25. Qinquan Zeren Fa (侵权责任法) [Tort Liability Law of People’s Republic
of China], (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of Nat’l People’s Cong. Dec.
26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz.
26. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Yiliao Sunhai Zeren Jiufen
Anjian Shiyong Falv Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理医疗损害
责任纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释) [Interpretations of the Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court regarding Problems in Determining Compensation for Medical
Negligence Cases], (promulgated by Supreme People’s Ct., Dec. 13, 2017, ef-
fective Dec. 14, 2017) [hereinafter SPC Interpretations on Medical Negligence
Liability].
27. See Tort Liability Law, art. 54.
28. See id., art. 54 and 58. See also SPC Interpretations on Medical Negli-
gence Liability, art. 4.
29. See Tort Liability Law, art. 60(1).
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den of proof, as do courts in the resolution of medical negli-
gence disputes.
In Chinese medical negligence litigation, medical opinions
are normally given through a special mechanism called “medi-
cal negligence authentication,” which is organized by an au-
thentication institution and performed by a group of medical
experts selected from the listed medical experts of the authen-
tication institution.
30
The selected authenticators must have no
personal interest in the dispute.
31
Parties may unilaterally or
jointly initiate medical negligence authentication before or dur-
ing the proceedings. The court, either upon the parties’ applica-
tion or its own initiative, may initiate medical negligence au-
thentication after the pleadings stage of litigation.
32
The court
will receive collective medical opinions stated in an authentica-
tion report issued in the name of the authentication institu-
tion.
33
The authenticators may be called to testify in court and
questioned under cross-examination by judges, lawyers, and
partisan medical experts.
34
Partisan medical experts may pro-
vide additional opinions on other technical issues arising from
the case, although they have rarely been invited by the parties
to medical negligence lawsuits.
35
B. Special Importance of Medical Negligence Authentication
Mechanism
The medical negligence authentication mechanism is of spe-
cial importance to Chinese medical negligence litigation for
three reasons. First, given the information asymmetry between
patients and medical care providers, Article 4 of SPC Interpre-
tations on Medical Negligence Liability allows the plaintiff-
patients to discharge their burden of proof regarding the issues
of fault and causation by applying to the court for medical neg-
30. See Yiliao Jiufen Yufang he Chuli Tiaoli (医疗纠纷预防和处理条例)
[Reg. on Prevention and Handling of Med. Disp.] (promulgated by the St.
Council, July 31, 2018, effective Oct. 1, 2018) ST. COUNCILGAZ., art. 34 & 35.
31. See Reg. on Prevention and Handling of Med. Disp., art. 37.
32. See SPC Interpretations on Medical Negligence Liability, art. 8 & 9.
33. See Reg. on Prevention and Handling of Med. Disp., art. 36.
34. See SPC Interpretations on Medical Negligence Liability, art. 13 & 14.
35. Xiaoyan Li & Hong Deng, Yiliao Jiufen Susong Zhong De Zhuangjia
Fuzhuren (医疗纠纷诉讼中的专家辅助人) [Assisting Experts in Litigation of
Medical Disputes], 24 ZHONGGUO WEISHENG FAZHI (中国卫生法制) [CHINAHEAL.
LEG. SYST.] 19, 19 (2016).
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ligence authentication if they are unable to provide any sup-
porting evidence.
36
In other words, medical negligence authen-
tication can be used by the plaintiffs to release their burden of
proof and may prevent them from losing the litigation despite
the lack of supporting evidence.
Second, medical experts are allowed to provide opinions on
both technical and legal issues. Specifically, the experts may
comment on the following issues: (1) fault in the diagnosis and
treatment; (2) causation between the fault and the damage,
and the “degree of causal contribution”
37
of the fault to the
damage; (3) breach of the duty of disclosure or the duty to ob-
tain written consent of the patient or their close relatives; (4)
the degree of severity of personal injury sustained by the pa-
tient-victim; (5) the nursing period, rest period, and nutrition
period that the patient-victim needs for recovery from personal
injury; and (6) other technical issues.
38
Among them, the first
three are legal issues and fall within the jurisdiction of courts.
Given the wide coverage of issues on which medical experts are
entitled to provide opinions, collective medical opinions given
through medical negligence authentication are similar to a rul-
ing of a medical professional tribunal.
Third, because parties are allowed to apply for re-
authentication on a statutory ground,
39
their application for re-
authentication functions as a “quasi-appeal” against the pro-
fessional ruling and therefore amounts to a different form of
“battle of the experts” in medical negligence litigation in China.
Although courts have discretion to decide whether to give leave
for re-authentication, Chinese civil procedure law has no cap on
how many times re-authentication may be conducted in a sin-
gle civil proceeding. Occasionally, medical negligence cases
36. See SPC Interpretations on Medical Negligence Liability, art. 4.
37. Yinguo Guanxi Canyu Du (因果关系参与度) [Degree of causal contribu-
tion] or Yuanyinli Daxiao (原因力大小) [Degree of causal potency] (which
means to what extent, among several causes, the defendant’s fault contrib-
utes to the damages sustained by the plaintiff). See, Chunbing Zhang &
Zhichun Du, Yiao Sunhai Sifa Jianding Yinguo Guanxi Fenxi Ji Canyudu
Panding (医疗损害司法鉴定因果关系分析及参与度判定) [Analysis of Causation
and Determination of the Degree of Casual Contribution in Medical Negli-
gence Authentication], 82 ZHONGGUO SIFA JIANDING (中国司法鉴定) [CHINESE
FORENSIC SCI.] 100, 100 (2005).
38. See SPC Interpretations on Medical Negligence Liability, art. 11.
39. See Provisions on Evidence in Civil Procedures, art. 27.
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may undergo re-authentication three times prior to the court’s
decision.
40
C. Dual Form of Medical Negligence Authentication
Article 11 of SPC Interpretations on Medical Negligence Lia-
bility provides a uniform medical negligence authentication
mechanism under which parties or courts may select a medical
association or forensic authentication agency to organize and
conduct medical negligence authentication and issue an au-
thentication report.
41
The medical negligence authentication
conducted by medical associations (MA-MNA), and that by fo-
rensic authentication agencies (FA-MNA), originated from the
abolished two-track system of medical negligence liability.
42
These two forms of medical negligence authentication signifi-
cantly differ in terms of the competence and neutrality of medi-
cal experts. Specifically, medical experts of MA-MNA normally
include medical practitioners, professors, or researchers spe-
cializing in a particular field of medicine and working at a
higher professional post for no less than three years, according
to Article 6 of Interim Measures on Medical Malpractice Tech-
nical Authentication.
43
In contrast, medical experts of FA-MNA
are normally qualified forensic experts who are registered with
the provincial Bureau of Justice but do not practice in medical
institutions, according to Article 3 of Decision of the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress on the Administra-
tion of Forensic Authentication.
44
They normally lack
knowledge or experience in clinical medicine. Therefore, medi-
40. In the author’s DAD database of medical negligence cases, there were
only five medical negligence cases involving re-authentication for three times.
41. See SPC Interpretations on Medical Negligence Liability, art. 11.
42. Chunyan Ding, Local Judicial Activism and Law Reform in China:
Medical Negligence Law as a Case Study (working paper, 2019) (on file with
the author).
43. See Yiliao Shigu Jishu Jianding Zanxing Banfa (医疗事故技术鉴定暂行
办法) [Interim Measures on Medical Malpractice Technical Authentication]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Health, July 31, 2002, effective Sept. 1,
2002) art. 6 [hereinafter MMTM Measures].
44. See Quanguo Renda Changweihui Guanyu Sifa Jianding Guanli Wenti
De Jueding (全国人大常委会关于司法鉴定管理问题的决定) [Decision of the
Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong. on the Admin. of Forensic Au-
thentication, hereinafter Decision on Forensic Authentication], (promulgated
by the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, Feb. 28, 2005, ef-
fective Oct. 1, 2005) art. 3.
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cal experts of MA-MNA have advantages over those of FA-
MNA in terms of competence.
Medical experts of MA-MNA, however, have been severely
criticized for professional protectionism and local protection-
ism.
45
Medical associations in China are established according
to administrative regions and administrative levels: municipal,
provincial, and national.
46
The municipal-level medical associa-
tions undertake the first-time medical negligence authentica-
tion and the provincial-level conduct re-authentication for med-
ical disputes occurring in their jurisdiction.
47
Few cases reach
the national medical association.
48
Medical associations at each
level establish their own list of qualified medical experts serv-
ing as authenticators, and local medical practitioners are given
priority listing over non-locals according to the locality rule.
49
Therefore, medical experts of MA-MNA who conduct authenti-
cation at the municipal level are usually medical practitioners
working in the local medical institutions and peers to the al-
leged negligent physicians.
By contrast, medical experts of FA-MNA are not local peers
to the alleged negligent physicians. They are affiliated to and
work in forensic authentication agencies. There is no bureau-
cratic or hierarchic relationship within forensic authentica-
tions.
50
Moreover, forensic authentication agencies are not sub-
45. The term “Professional protectionism” refers to professional bias to
improperly maintain professional power and interests, and a tendency of pro-
fessionals to protect each other from outside scrutiny and cover up each oth-
er’s misconducts. The term “local protectionism” refers to local bias to rule in
favor of locals and a tendency to place the interests of the locality above the
merits of a case. See CHUNYAN DING, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE LAW IN
TRANSITIONAL CHINA 153-59 (2012); Lin Lin, Yixuehui Congshi Yiliao Sunhai
Jianding De Fansi Yu Chonggou (医学会从事医疗损害鉴定的反思与重构) [Re-
flection and Restructuring of Medical Negligence Authentication Conducted by
Medical Association], ZHIFU SHIDAI (致富时代) [FORTUNE TIMES] 198, 198-199
(2017).
46. The national medical association is called Zhonghua Yixue Hui (中华医
学会) [Chinese Medical Association], which is located in Beijing, see the
Website of Chinese Medical Association, http://www.cma.org.cn (last visited
Nov. 20, 2019).
47. SeeMMTA Measures, art. 3.
48. In the author’s DAD database of medical negligence cases, there were
only five medical negligence cases involving MA-MNA conducted by the na-
tional medical association.
49. SeeMMTA Measures, art. 6
50. See Decision on Forensic Authentication, art. 8.
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ject to the locality rule.
51
As such, they can employ both local
and non-local medical experts and undertake both local and
non-local medical negligence cases. Medical experts of FA-
MNA, therefore, have received little criticism for professional
protectionism or local protectionism. The public generally re-
gard them as more neutral and trustworthy than medical ex-
perts of MA-MNA.
II. SELECTION BIAS, ADVERSARIAL BIAS, AND JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE TO EXPERT OPINIONS IN CHINESEMEDICAL
NEGLIGENCE LITIGATION
The uniform medical negligence authentication mechanism
operating in medical negligence litigation has two distinguish-
ing features from expert opinions employed in other civil pro-
ceedings in China. One is that it only produces institutional-
ized medical opinions. Because expert opinions are collectively
made and issued in the name of the authentication institution,
this study is concerned with authentication institutions rather
than individual experts. The other feature is its dual form of
medical negligence authentication: MA-MNA and FA-MNA.
Hence, selection bias, adversarial bias, and judicial deference
to expert opinions in the Chinese medical negligence litigation
setting are demonstrated in special ways.
In terms of selection bias, because disputing parties are enti-
tled to initiate medical negligence authentication and may se-
lect either MA-MNA or FA-MNA to conduct it, this study will
investigate whether the plaintiffs and the defendants have dif-
ferent preferences in selecting the form of medical negligence
authentication. Because MA-MNA has been criticized for its
lack of neutrality,
52
this study hypothesizes that the plaintiff-
patients prefer to select FA-MNA, while the defendant²medical
care providers prefer to select MA-MNA. Moreover, the parties
are entitled to apply to the court for re-authentication when
they do not accept expert opinions given through the first-time
medical negligence authentication. This study will also investi-
gate the selection bias of the parties in medical negligence law-
suits that involve re-authentication. Because re-authentication
may be seen as a “quasi-appeal” against the professional ruling
and a form of “battle of the experts,” this study hypothesizes
51. Id.
52. Ding, supra note 45, at 153²59; Lin, supra note 45, at 198²99.
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that both the plaintiffs and the defendants show a stronger se-
lection bias when applying for re-authentication.
As courts have the power to initiate medical negligence au-
thentication, this study will also investigate whether courts
have any preference in selecting the form of medical negligence
authentication and, if so, which form is preferred. Given that
courts are supposed to be neutral in dealing with medical neg-
ligence cases and courts (except those in Shanghai and Jiangsu
Province, which are required to prioritize MA-MNA due to
their local interpretations)
53
are free to appoint medical experts
of either MA-MNA or FA-MNA, this study hypothesizes that
courts do not display selection bias when initiating medical
negligence authentication.
In terms of adversarial bias, as noted above, it has been as-
serted that MA-MNA is more likely to deliver expert opinions
in favor of the defendant²medical care providers due to profes-
sional protectionism and local protectionism, while FA-MNA
does not have such an inclination. Although the concept of “ad-
versarial bias” commonly means the witness bias that arises
because experts are retained to advance the cause of one party
to an adversarial proceedings,
54
expert opinions given through
MA-MNA in favor of the defendant²medical care providers can
be seen as “institutional adversarial bias” in Chinese inquisito-
rial medical negligence proceedings. This study intends to pro-
vide empirical evidence to determine whether the assertion
about adversarial bias of MA-MNA can be verified from two
perspectives: professional protectionism and local protection-
ism.
In terms of professional protectionism, this study hypothesiz-
es that expert opinions of MA-MNA are much more in favor of
53. See Jiangsusheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Jiangsusheng Weishengting
Guanyu Yiliao Sunhai Jianding Gongzuo De Ruogan Yijian (Shixing) (江苏省
高级人民法院、江苏省卫生厅关于医疗损害鉴定工作的若干意见(试行)) [Interim
Opinions of the High People’s Court of Jiangsu Province and the Provincial
Health Bureau of Jiangsu Province regarding Medical Negligence Authentica-
tion], (promulgated by the High People’s Court of Jiangsu Province, Oct. 11,
2010, effective Oct. 11, 2010), art. 2. See also, Shanghaishi Gaoji Renmin
Fayuan Guanyu Weituo Yiliao Sunhai Sifa Jianding Ruogan Wenti De Zanx-
ing Guiding (上海市高级人民法院关于委托医疗损害司法鉴定若干问题的暂行规
定) [Interim Rules of the High People’s Court of Shanghai regarding Problems
on Court-delegated Medical Negligence Authentication], (promulgated by the
High People’s Court of Shanghai, Jan. 1, 2011, effective Jan 1, 2011), art. 2.
54. Bernstein, supra note 4, at 453.
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the defendant²medical care providers than those of FA-MNA,
and vice versa. In terms of local protectionism, this study hy-
pothesizes that medical opinions of MA-MNA organized by
medical associations in the same location
55
as the defendants
are more in favor of the defendants than those organized by
medical associations in a different location from the defendant,
and that expert opinions of FA-MNA do not display local pro-
tectionism because it is not subject to the locality rule. Under
the medical negligence authentication mechanism, the provin-
cial-level and national medical associations normally conduct
re-authentication and function as the “appellant medical asso-
ciation” to deal with a “quasi-appeal” against the professional
ruling made by the first-time MA-MNA.
56
Unlike MA-MNA
conducted by the municipal-level medical associations, for MA-
MNA conducted by the provincial- or national-level medical as-
sociations, the pool of listed medical experts for selection is not
limited to local medical practitioners working within the city of
the defendants. The provincial- or national-level medical asso-
ciations have a looser connection with the defendant²medical
care providers than the municipal-level ones. This study hy-
pothesizes that medical opinions of MA-MNA organized by the
municipal-level medical associations are more in favor of the
defendants than those organized by the provincial- or national-
level medical associations.
In practice, a medical negligence authentication report in-
cludes at least four major issues: (1) fault in the diagnosis and
treatment; (2) causation between the fault and the damage; (3)
the degree of causal contribution of the fault to the damage;
and (4) the degree of severity of personal injury sustained by
the plaintiff.
57
The legal issues of fault and causation are criti-
cal for establishing medical negligence liability, and the degree
of causal contribution and the degree of severity of personal
injury significantly influence the amount of damages award-
ed.
58
This study will look into medical opinions of MA-MNA and
FA-MNA regarding each of the above four issues in order to
test its hypothesis regarding adversarial bias.
55. As noted in the part of “Data and Methods of the Research” below, the
location variable was defined as the municipal level in this study.
56. SeeMMTM Measures, art. 3.
57. Zhang & Du, supra note 37.
58. Id.
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Finally, with regard to judicial deference, some civil law ju-
risdictions report that court-appointed experts are likely to be-
come the de facto decision-makers in determining contested
technical issues.
59
English courts treated the medical profes-
sional with excessive deference in medical negligence litigation,
but the position has changed recently.
60
There has been no em-
pirical evidence, however, on judicial deference to expert opin-
ions in China. In the vast majority of medical negligence cases,
judges are assisted by medical experts through medical negli-
gence authentication.
61
Only in exceptional cases do judges ad-
judicate without medical opinions, either because medical neg-
ligence authentication institutions refuse to accept the case or
because they are unable to deliver expert opinions due to the
lack of necessary case materials, such as medical records or an
autopsy report.
62
To investigate judicial deference to expert
opinions in the Chinese medical negligence litigation setting,
this study will only investigate medical negligence cases with
medical opinions given through medical negligence authentica-
tion, and will only examine judicial attitudes toward expert
opinions regarding the four issues: fault, causation, degree of
causal contribution, and degree of severity of personal injury.
This study hypothesizes that, similar to judges in other civil
law jurisdictions, Chinese judges present high judicial defer-
ence to expert opinions in medical negligence litigation.
III. DATA ANDMETHODS OF THE RESEARCH
After setting up the hypotheses regarding selection bias, ad-
versarial bias, and judicial deference to expert opinions, this
part of the article discusses the source, scope, and coverage of
the data used to test these hypotheses, as well as the methods
of coding major measurements. Moreover, this study surveyed
59. Jurs, supra note 6, at 1389.
60. The Right Honourable the Lord Woolf, Are the Courts Excessively Def-
erential to the Medical Professional?, 9 MED. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001).
61. As noted above, partisan medical experts have seldom been invited to
give expert opinions in Chinese medical negligence litigation, see Li & Deng,
supra note 35.
62. Wentao Xia, Silei Tao & Qing Xia, Dangqian Yiliao Sunhai Jianding
Yijianshu Changjian Wenti Pouxi (当前医疗损害鉴定意见书常见问题剖析)
[Analysis on the Current Common Problems of Medical Negligence Authenti-
cation Reports], 99 ZHONGGUO SIFA JIANDING (中国司法鉴定) [CHINESE
FORENSIC SCI.] 18, 21 (2018).
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Chinese judges with experience in adjudicating medical negli-
gence cases in order to further investigate social, legal, and in-
stitutional factors relevant to explain the findings.
A. Data
The DAD
63
database of medical negligence cases used in this
study were collected from the Supreme People’s Court’s official
online database, called “China Adjudication Decisions
Online.”
64
All Chinese courts have been required to upload ad-
judication decisions to this database since January 1, 2014, ex-
cept those cases involving state secrets, business secrets, priva-
cy issues, and adolescent criminals, in accordance with Provi-
sions of the Supreme People’s Court on Online Publication of
Judgments by the People’s Courts.
65
Medical negligence cases
do not fall into the category of exceptional cases.
The author searched judgments of medical negligence cases
by the cause of action “medical negligence liability,”
66
as stipu-
lated in Provisions on the Cause of Action of Civil Cases.
67
Spe-
cifically, this study focuses on all judgments of medical negli-
gence cases made in 2016 and published in “China Adjudica-
tion Decisions Online” as of October 30, 2017, which were used
to establish the DAD database. This was for three reasons.
First, in order to avoid sample bias and establish a complete
DAD database, the author decided to use a full dataset of one-
year of medical negligence judgments in China. Second, as of
October 30, 2017, the author searched and found that the
number of first-instance medical negligence cases were 3,093 in
2014, 3,416 in 2015, and 3,769 in 2016, showing that the case
number increased annually by 10% from 2014 to 2016. The
2016 dataset presents the largest number of medical negligence
63. Caipan Wenshu (裁判文书) [Documents of adjudication decisions], su-
pra note 22.
64. Zhongguo Caipan Wenshu Wang (中国裁判文书网) [China Adjudication
Decisions Online], http://wenshu.court.gov.cn (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).
65. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Zai Hulianwang
Gongbu Caipan Wenshu De Guiding (最高人民法院关于人民法院在互联网公布
裁判文书的规定) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Online Publica-
tion of Judgments by the People’s Courts] (promulgated by the Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court, Nov. 21, 2013, effective Jan. 1, 2014, amended in 2016).
66. Yiliao Sunhai Zeren (医疗损害责任) [Medical negligence liability].
67. Minshi Anjian Anyou Guiding (民事案件案由规定) [Provisions on the
Cause of Action of Civil Cases] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court,
Feb. 18, 2011, effective April 1, 2011).
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cases available in recent years. Third, the uniform medical neg-
ligence authentication mechanism was not established by Tort
Liability Law in the 2009 tort law reform, but was instead in-
troduced by the local judiciary after the implementation of Tort
Liability Law.
68
By the end of 2015, most local courts had
adopted the uniform medical negligence authentication mecha-
nism with the dual form of MA-MNA and FA-MNA.
69
The 2016
data therefore better serve the purpose of this research.
As some adjudication decisions were repeatedly uploaded by
courts to “China Adjudication Decisions Online,” after the au-
thor cleared the dataset, the DAD database of medical negli-
gence cases finally included 3,619 medical negligence cases for
2016. It is common, however, for courts to delay uploading ad-
judication decisions to “China Adjudication Decisions Online.”
70
Compared to the search results on judgments of medical negli-
gence cases in 2016 as of December 31, 2018, the DAD data-
base covered 57.19% of 5,823 first-instance cases, 7.16% of
3,130 appeal cases, and 60.75% of 107 retrial cases.
71
B. Methods
The author developed a coding scheme and trained two inde-
pendent coders for content analysis. The inter-coder reliability,
68. Ding, supra note 45.
69. After the implementation of Tort Liability Law in July 2010, Chinese
local courts (such as those in Zhejiang Province, Beijing, Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, Hubei Province, Shenzhen and Anhui Province) issued
their local judicial interpretations on medical negligence liability from 2010
to 2015. Among them, Anhui Province was the last one, and its local judicial
interpretations were promulgated in January 2015.
70. Deyun Han, JINYIBU WANSHAN FAYUAN CAIPAN WENSHU WANGSHANG
GONGKAI GONGZUO (进一步完善法院裁判文书网上公开工作) [FURTHER
IMPROVING THE WORK OF ONLINE PUBLICATION OF ADJUDICATION DECISIONS OF
COURTS] (2015), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/dbdhhy/12_3/2015-
03/09/content_1916981.htm; Chao Ma, Xiaohong Yu & Haibo He, Dashuju
Fenxi: Zhongguo Sifa Caipan Wenshu Shangwang Gongkai Baogao (大数据分
析: 中国司法裁判文书上网公开报告) [Big Data Analysis: A Report on Online
Publication of Chinese Documents of Adjudication Decisions], ZHONGGUO
FALV PINGLUN (中国法律评论) [CHINA L. REV.] 195, 209, 231 (2016).
71. As exceptions, closed cases may be re-opened and re-tried where statu-
tory conditions are met in the Chinese legal system, see Yaxin Wang, Minshi
Zaishen: Chengxu De Fazhan Ji Qi Jieshi Shiyong (民事再审：程序的发展及其
解释适用) [Civil Retrials: The Development of the Procedure and the Applica-
tion of the Relevant Judicial Interpretations], BEIFANG FAXUE (北方法学) [N.
LEG. SCI.] 117, 117-119 (2016).
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measured by Cohen’s Kappa,
72
was 0.824.
73
First, the following
basic information of cases were coded, including the level of the
trial, the level of the court, the location of the court, the type of
proceedings (i.e., summary procedure
74
or trial by collegial pan-
el),
75
the characteristics of the patient-victim (urban or rural),
the characteristics of the defendant²medical care providers, the
level of the public hospital (from highest third-level to the low-
est first-level hospitals),
76
the amount of the claimed compensa-
tion, and the amount of the damages award. In addition, the
following seven major measurements were coded:
The first measurement was the existence of expert opinions
given through medical negligence authentication. The cases
with and without expert opinions given through medical negli-
gence authentication were coded as 1 or 0, respectively.
The second was the form of medical negligence authentica-
tion involved in each medical negligence case: MA-MNA or FA-
MNA. Because some cases only underwent medical negligence
authentication once and others had re-authentications up to
three times, all medical negligence authentications involved in
the dataset were categorized into two groups: (1) those with
medical opinions admitted and considered by the court for the
purpose of making judicial decisions; and (2) those with medi-
cal opinions challenged by the parties and then replaced by the
new medical opinions through re-authentication. The form of
medical negligence authentications in both group 1 and group 2
were coded.
72. See generally, Mary L. McHugh, Interrater Reliability: The Kappa Sta-
tistic, 22 BIOCHEMIAMEDICA 276, 276²82 (2012).
73. The value of kappa above 0.81 indicates very good agreement beyond
chance or almost perfert in terms of strength of agreement. See, MARTIN
BLAND, AN INTRODUCTION TOMEDICAL STATISTICS (4th ed. 2015).
74. Jianyi Chengxu (简易程序) [Summary procedure], see Civil Procedure
Law, art. 157.
75. Heyiting (合议庭) [Collegial panel], see Civil Procedure Law, art. 39.
76. In China, public hospitals are classified into three levels (with several
grades in each level) and a total of ten categories. The highest category of
hospitals is “Sanjia Tedeng Yiyuan (三甲特等医院) [the special-grade of the
third-level hospitals], and the lowest category is Yiji Bingdeng Yiyuan (一级丙
等医院) [the third-grade of the first-level hospitals]. See Yiyuan Fenji Guanli
Banfa (Shixing) (医院分级管理办法(试行)) [Interim Measures on the Manage-
ment of the Classification of Hospitals] (promulgated by the Ministry of the
Health, Nov. 29, 1989 effective Nov. 29, 1989).
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The third coded measurement was the party who initiated
medical negligence authentication. The initiator may be (1) the
plaintiff-patient, (2) the defendant²medical care provider, (3)
both parties, or (4) the court. In the re-authentication cases,
the initiators also included these four categories.
The fourth was the location of MA-MNA and FA-MNA in-
volved in medical negligence cases and the location of the de-
fendant²medical care providers. The location variable was de-
fined as the municipal level; that is, two cities within the same
province were seen as different locations. When the location of
the medical association and that of the defendants were the
same, it was coded as 1. When they differed, it was coded as 0.
The fifth was the level of MA-MNA involved in medical negli-
gence cases: municipal, provincial, or national levels.
The sixth was expert opinions given through MA-MNA and
FA-MNA regarding the following four issues: (1) fault in the
diagnosis and treatment (“fault”); (2) causation between the
fault and the damage (“causation”); (3) the degree of causal
contribution of the fault to the damage (“causal contribution”);
and (4) the degree of severity of personal injury sustained by
the patient-victim (“injury degree”). Specifically, expert opin-
ions about the issues of fault and causation were either positive
or negative, which were coded as 1 or 0, respectively. Expert
opinions on the issue of causal contribution varied across a
spectrum, as shown in Table 1, which was established by lower
courts through their local judicial interpretations
77
and finally
confirmed by the Supreme People’s Court in Article 12 of SPC
Interpretations on Medical Negligence Liability. Expert opin-
ions on the issue of injury degree varied from death, injury
grade 1 to injury grade 10, or no injury. The criteria on injury
degree were established by Classification Criteria for Medical
Malpractice Cases (for Trial Implementation).
78
77. See Guangdongsheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan
Weituo Yiliao Sunhan Jianding Ruogan Wenti De Yijian (广东省高级人民法院
关于人民法院委托医疗损害鉴定若干问题的意见(试行)) [Interim Opinions of the
High People’s Court of Guangdong Province regarding Problems on Court-
delegated Medical Negligence Authentication], (promulgated by the High Peo-
ple’s Court of Guangdong Province, Nov. 17, 2011, effective Nov. 17, 2011),
art. 17.
78. Yiliao Shigu Fenji Biaozhun (Shixing) (医疗事故分级标准(试行)),
(promulgated by the Ministry of Health, July 31, 2002, effective, Sept. 1,
2002) No. 32, Ministry of Health. It was replaced by Renti Sunshang Zhican
Chengdu Fenji (人体损伤致残程度分级) [The Classification of Severity of Per-
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The seventh measurement was judicial attitudes toward ad-
mitted medical opinions given through MA-MNA and FA-MNA
regarding each of the above four issues. Depending on whether
the courts accepted expert opinions, it was coded as 1 and 0,
respectively.
To further investigate the social, legal, and institutional fac-
tors that contribute to selection bias, adversarial bias, and ju-
dicial deference to expert opinions, this study also did a small
survey by questionnaire among two “senior judges”
79
and three
judges who had adjudication experience of six, seven, eight,
eleven, and fifteen years, respectively. Three of them were from
Guangdong Province, and the other two were from Fujian Prov-
ince and Sichuan Province, respectively. They all had experi-
ence in adjudicating medical negligence cases.
Table 1: The Spectrum of Causal Contribution of the Defend-
ant’s Fault
Classification of Causal Contribution Percentage
No Contribution 0%
Slight Contribution 1-20%
Secondary Contribution 21-40%
Equal Contribution 41-60%
Primary Contribution 61-90%
Full Contribution 91-100%
Source: Author.
sonal Injuries] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Na-
tional Security, and the Ministry of Justice, Apr. 18, 2016, effective Jan. 1,
2017).
79. Gaoji Faguan (高级法官). “Senior judge” is one of the professional titles
applied to Chinese judges. It is lower than the professional title of “justice”
and higher than the professional title of “judge.” See Xuebin Hou, Woguo
Faguan Dengji Zhidu Zhi Jiantao (我国法官等级制度之检讨) [Review of the
Judge Ranking System in China], FASHANG YANJIU (法商研究) [STUD. L. BUS.]
95, 96 (2013).
2019] How Much Do Expert Opinions Matter? 159
IV. FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH
This part of the article reports the findings of this empirical
research. It first presents an overview of the collected data on
medical negligence cases in terms of the level of the trial, the
level of the court, the type of proceedings, the location alloca-
tion, the characteristics of the parties, and the winning rate of
the plaintiff-patients. More importantly, this part reports the
major findings concerning selection bias, adversarial bias, and
judicial deference, respectively. It also examines whether the
findings support or contradict the hypothesis regarding selec-
tion bias, adversarial bias, and judicial deference to expert
opinions set up in part two of this article.
A. Overview
Of the 3,619 medical negligence cases of 2016 in the DAD da-
tabase, 1,143 cases (31.6%) were decided through summary
procedure without a collegial panel and 2,476 cases (68.4%)
through normal procedure with a collegial panel. Table 2 shows
that 93.64% of cases were adjudicated by the district courts;
most of them were first-instance cases and a few were retrial
cases. 6.30% of cases were adjudicated by the intermediate
courts; most of them were appeal cases. The DAD database on-
ly has a few cases adjudicated by the high courts. Table 3
shows that 92.01% of cases were first-instance cases, 6.19%
were appeal cases, and 1.80% were retrial cases.
The location allocation of medical negligence cases nation-
wide is shown in Figure 1. The top five provinces in terms of
number of cases were Jiangsu Province (348 cases), Jilin Prov-
ince (335 cases), Shandong Province (271 cases), Henan Prov-
ince (224 cases), and Anhui Province (221 cases). Among the
four municipalities directly under the Central Government,
80
Shanghai (121 cases), Chongqing (121 cases), and Beijing (112
cases) had a similar quantity of cases, although Tianjin (43
cases) had much fewer.
80. Within the administrative structure of the Chinese government, mu-
nicipalities directly under the Central Government are at the same level with
the province. There are currently four municipalities directly under the Cen-
tral Government: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing. See Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Quhua (中华人民共和国行政区划) [The Admin.
Structure of the People’s Republic of China], St. Council Gaz.,
http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-06/15/content_18253.htm (last visited Nov. 20,
2019).
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Of the 2,072 medical negligence cases with valid data, 1,594
cases (76.9%) involved urban patient-victims and 478 cases
(23.1%) involved rural patient-victims. Of the 2,973 medical
negligence cases with valid data, the ratio of male patient-
victims to female patient-victims is 53.4 to 46.6. Of the 2,916
medical negligence cases with valid data, the third-level public
hospitals were sued in 1,593 cases (54.6%), the second-level
public hospitals were sued in 938 cases (32.2%), the first-level
public hospitals were sued in 4 cases (0.1%), community health
care centers were sued in 235 cases (8.1%), and private medical
care providers were sued in 146 cases (5%). Of the 3,582 medi-
cal negligence cases with valid data, 84.7% of the plaintiffs had
lawyers and 84.5% of the defendants hired lawyers.
Table 4 is concerned with the winning rate of plaintiffs in the
3,559 medical negligence cases with valid data. Medical negli-
gence cases always involve monetary remedies for personal in-
juries; one measurement is the plaintiff’s compensation claim,
and the other measurement is the court’s damages award. In
order to present not only the winning rate of plaintiffs, but also
show the extent to which the courts supported their claims for
compensation, the author used the ratio of the awarded
amount to the claimed amount of compensation. The plaintiff
lost the case when the ratio is 0; otherwise, the winning index
varies from 0²0.25 (i.e., the court award accounted for one-
quarter of the claimed amount, included), 0.25²0.5 (i.e., the
court award accounted for one half of the claimed amount, in-
cluded), 0.5²0.75 (i.e., the court award accounted for three-
quarters of the claimed amount, included), 0.75²1.0 (excluded),
1.0 (i.e., the court fully awarded the claimed amount), and in
rare cases !1.0 (i.e., the court’s awarded amount was more
than the claimed amount).
81
Table 4 shows that the plaintiffs were not awarded compen-
sation in 11.04% of the first-instance cases, 19.25% of the ap-
peal cases, and 6.15% of the retrial cases. This means that the
winning rate of the plaintiff in medical negligence litigation
was 88.96% in the first-instance cases, 80.75% in the appeal
cases, and 93.85% in the retrial cases, which are much higher
81. The percentage of litigation fees or authentication fees that the court
decided the plaintiff should be responsible for did not necessarily match the
winning rate of the plaintiff in medical negligence cases. Therefore, the au-
thor did not use litigation fees or authentication fees to measure the winning
rate in this study.
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than the winning rate of the plaintiff in other tort litigations,
such as defamation cases.
82
Among these winning cases, the
plaintiffs received compensation of more than one half the
claimed amount in 40.22% of the first-instance cases, 25.67% of
the appeal cases, and 26.15% of the retrial cases. The plaintiffs
were compensated less than one half of the claimed amount in
48.75% of the first-instance cases, 55.08% of the appeal cases,
and 67.69% of the retrial cases.
82. Xin He & Fen Lin, The Losing Media? An Empirical Study of Defama-
tion Litigation in China, 230 CHINAQ. 371, 383 (2017).
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Table 2: Medical Negligence Litigation by Level of Court
Frequency Percent
District courts 3389 93.64
Intermediate courts 228 6.3
High courts 2 0.06
Total 3619 100
Sources: Author.
Table 3: Medical Negligence Litigation by Level of Trial
Frequency Percent
First-instance cases 3330 92.01
Appeal cases 224 6.19
Retrial cases 65 1.8
Total 3619 100
Sources: Author.
Figure 1: Medical Negligence Litigation by Location in Main-
land China
Sources: Author.
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B. Selection Bias
Of the total 3,619 medical negligence cases in the DAD data-
base, 479 cases (13.24%) did not involve expert opinions given
through MNA. Of the 3,140 medical negligence cases (86.76%)
with expert opinions given through MNA, thirteen cases had no
information on the form of medical negligence authentication.
Of the 3,127 medical negligence cases with information on the
form of medical negligence authentication, some involved sev-
eral MNAs due to re-authentication. The DAD database in-
cluded a total of 3,868 MNAs, 2,670 of them (69.03%) were FA-
MNAs, and 1,198 of them (30.97%) were MA-MNAs.
Table 5 shows the form of MNA by the type of initiators. Of
the 3,409 MNAs with information about initiators, the plain-
tiffs initiated MNA in 246 cases (7.22%), the defendants initi-
ated MNA in 192 cases (5.63%), the parties jointly initiated
MNA in 203 cases (5.95%), and courts initiated MNA in 2,768
cases (81.20%). Although most of the MNAs were initiated by
courts, the data remain useful to demonstrate selection bias of
the parties.
As Table 5 indicates, 71.14% of the plaintiff initiators pre-
ferred FA-MNA, and 82.81% of the defendant initiators pre-
ferred MA-MNA. When MNA was jointly initiated by the par-
ties, FA-MNA were preferred in 67% of cases. These findings
support the hypothesis that plaintiff-patients prefer to select
FA-MNA while defendant²medical care providers prefer to se-
lect MA-MNA.
Turning to MNAs in re-authentication cases, 74.29% of the
plaintiff-initiated re-MNAs were FA-MNA, and 88.89% of the
defendant-initiated re-MNAs were MA-MNA; both are higher
than the correspondent overall results. Of the jointly-initiated
re-MNAs, 51.16% were FA-MNA, lower than the equivalent
overall result. The re-MNA data support the hypothesis that
both parties show a stronger selection bias in re-authentication
cases, although the plaintiffs displayed a less strong preference
for FA-MNA in the jointly-initiated re-authentication cases.
Table 5 also shows that courts preferred FA-MNA. Among
the MNAs initiated by courts, 74.46% of them were FA-MNA,
even higher than the correspondent result of the plaintiff-
initiated MNAs. This measurement in re-authentication cases,
however, decreased to 50.07%, which means that FA-MNA and
MA-MNA had an equal chance to be selected by courts in re-
authentication cases.
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Table 6 is concerned with the form of court-initiated medical
negligence authentication and shows the overall results, as
well as the results excluding court-initiated MNAs in Jiangsu
Province and Shanghai. Because court-initiated MNAs are re-
quired to use MA-MNA as priority due to the local interpreta-
tions of Jiangsu Province and Shanghai,
83
the courts therein do
not have freedom of choice. Therefore, the results can more ac-
curately reveal whether courts had selection bias by excluding
court-initiated MNAs of Jiangsu Province and Shanghai. As
Table 6 shows, once the data of Jiangsu Province and Shanghai
are excluded, 89.12% of court-initiated MNAs were FA-MNA,
and 79.81% of court-initiated MNAs were FA-MNA in re-
authentication cases. These findings contradict the hypothesis
that courts do not have selection bias. Indeed, courts have a
very strong preference to select FA-MNA.
83. Interim Opinions of the High People’s Court of Jiangsu, supra note 53,
art. 2; Interim Rules of the High People’s Court of Shanghai, supra note 53,
art. 2.
166 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 45:1
Table 5: The Form of MNA by the Type of Initiators
FA-MNA MA-MNA Cases Chi-square
Types of initiators 284.76***
Plaintiff 175 71.14% 71 28.86% 246
Defendant 33 17.19% 159 82.81% 192
Both 136 67.00% 67 33.00% 203
Court 2061 74.46% 707 25.54% 2768
Total 2405 1004 3409
Missing 459
Types of initiators in re-MNAs 92.90***
Plaintiff 104 74.29% 36 25.71% 140
Defendant 11 11.11% 88 88.89% 99
Both 22 51.16% 21 48.84% 43
Court 346 50.07% 345 49.93% 691
Total 483 490 973
Missing 133
Sources: Author.
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 6: The Form of the Court-Initiated MNA
FA-MNA MA-MNA Cases
Court-initiated MNA
All places 2061 74.46% 707 25.54% 2768
Exclude Jiangsu &
Shanghai 2040 89.12% 249 10.88% 2289
Court-initiated MNA in re-MNAs
All places 346 50.07% 345 49.93% 691
Exclude Jiangsu &
Shanghai 340 79.81% 86 20.19% 426
Sources: Author.
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C. Adversarial Bias
As noted in Part II of this article, the issue of adversarial bias
of expert opinions in Chinese medical negligence litigation is
examined from two perspectives: professional protectionism
and local protectionism. As such, the empirical findings regard-
ing adversarial bias are also presented from these two perspec-
tives.
1. Professional Protectionism
Table 7 shows expert opinions on the four issues regarding
medical negligence liability (that is, fault, causation, causal
contribution, and injury degree) given through FA-MNA and
MA-MNA. In terms of the fault issue, 97.72% of FA-MNAs
found fault on the part of the defendant, while 82.17% of MA-
MNAs found fault on the part of the defendant, with a differ-
ence of 15.55%. In terms of the causation issue, 95.63% of FA-
MNAs found causation, while 69.87% of MA-MNAs found cau-
sation. The difference,25.76%, is much larger than the differ-
ence regarding the fault issue.
In terms of the causal contribution issue, FA-MNA found a
“slight contribution” (13.40% versus 12.52%), “secondary con-
tribution” (29.73% versus 21.69%), “equal contribution”
(22.48% versus 8.62%), “primary contribution” (25.36% versus
22.14%), and “full contribution” (4.50% versus 4.45%) in a
higher percentage of cases than MA-MNA did. Moreover,
30.58% of MA-MNAs found no contribution, much higher than
4.54% in FA-MNAs. Figure 2 presents a comparison between
expert opinions of FA-MNA and MA-MNA regarding the causal
contribution issue. Except for “no contribution,” the FA-MNA
line is always above the MA-MNA line. The gap between the
two lines becomes much bigger for “secondary contribution”
and is largest for “equal contribution.” Because the issue of
causal contribution influences the defendant’s contribution to
the plaintiff’s damages for personal injury and the ultimate
amount of damages award, the findings reveal that expert
opinions of MA-MNA are more in favor of the defendants than
those of FA-MNA in terms of lessening their medical negli-
gence liability.
Turning to the issue of injury degree, medical experts have
little discretion in determining cases involving injuries from
death to level 10 because the current law has set out the clear
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classifications of severity of personal injuries.
84
They do have
some discretion, however, in determining cases between level
10 injury and no injury. The findings show that 26.48% of MA-
MNAs found no injury, which is almost double the 13.58%
found in FA-MNAs.
The above findings on expert opinions of FA-MNA and MA-
MNA regarding the four issues support the hypothesis that ex-
pert opinions of MA-MNA are much more in favor of the de-
fendant²medical care providers than those of FA-MNA, and
vice versa.
84. Interim Opinions of the High People’s Court of Guangdong Province,
supra note 77.
2019] How Much Do Expert Opinions Matter? 169
Table 7: Expert Opinions on the Four Issues of Medical Negli-
gence Liability by the Form of MNA
FA-MNA MA-MNA Cases Chi-square
Fault 281.86***
No 56 2.28% 204 17.83% 260
Yes 2401 97.72% 940 82.17% 3341
Total 2457 100.00% 1144 100.00% 3601
Missing 267
Causation 462.57***
No 105 4.37% 339 30.13% 444
Yes 2299 95.63% 786 69.87% 3085
Total 2404 100.00% 1125 100.00% 3529
Missing 339
Causal contribution 489.06***
None 104 4.54% 337 30.58% 441
Slight 307 13.40% 138 12.52% 445
Secondary 681 29.73% 239 21.69% 920
Equal 515 22.48% 95 8.62% 610
Primary 581 25.36% 244 22.14% 825
Full 103 4.50% 49 4.45% 152
Total 2291 100.00% 1102 100.00% 3393
Missing 475
Injury degree 167.07***
None 313 13.58% 278 26.48% 591
Level 8-10 582 25.25% 133 12.67% 715
Level 5-7 261 11.32% 66 6.29% 327
Level 1-4 197 8.55% 88 8.38% 285
Death 952 41.30% 485 46.19% 1437
Total 2305 100.00% 1050 100.00% 3355
Missing 513
Sources: Author.
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure 2: Causal Contribution by the Form of MNA
Sources: Author.
2. Local Protectionism
Of the 1,133 MA-MNAs with valid data, the location of medi-
cal associations was different from that of the defendant in 316
MA-MNAs (27.89%). By contrast, of the 2,648 FA-MNAs with
valid data, the location of forensic authentication agencies was
different from that of the defendant in 1,759 FA-MNAs
(66.43%). In other words, 72.11% of MA-MNAs involved local
defendants, compared to 33.57% of FA-MNA cases.
A comparison was made of expert opinions of MA-MNA be-
tween medical associations with the same location as the de-
fendants and those with a different location. They differ signifi-
cantly in terms of finding fault (79.66% versus 87.74%), finding
causation (66.62% versus 77.92%), and finding no injury
(30.33% versus 18.75%). By contrast, expert opinions of FA-
MNA do not significantly differ by the same or different loca-
tion between forensic authentication agencies and defendants
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in terms of finding fault (97.47% versus 97.84%), finding causa-
tion (96.07% versus 95.40%), and finding no injury (15.81%
versus 12.39%).
Table 8 compares expert opinions of MA-MNA regarding the
issue of causal contribution by the same or different location
between the medical associations and the defendants. The dif-
ference is significant (chi-square = 21.59, p < 0.001). Figure 3
shows that when the medical association was located in the
same city as the defendant, expert opinions of MA-MNA found
more “no-contribution” cases (34.10% versus 21.93%) and
“slight contribution” cases (13.34% versus 11.96%) but fewer
“secondary contribution” cases (18.73% v. 28.24%), “equal con-
tribution” cases (7.95% v. 8.97%), “primary contribution”
(21.97% v. 23.26%) and “full contribution” cases (3.91% v. 5.65
%) than those of MA-MNA when the medical association and
the defendant were not located in the same city.
For the purpose of comparison, Figure 4 provides expert opin-
ions of FA-MNA regarding the issue of causal contribution by
the same or different location between the forensic authentica-
tion agencies and the defendants. Expert opinions of FA-MNA
do not differ between local and non-local defendants in “no con-
tribution” and “slight contribution” cases. Interestingly, Figure
4 demonstrates an opposite tendency of local discrimination:
expert opinions of FA-MNA found more “primary contribution”
and “full contribution” cases, and fewer “secondary contribu-
tion” and “equal contribution” cases (i.e., less liability) in cases
involving non-local defendants.
The above findings support the hypothesis that medical opin-
ions of MA-MNA organized by medical associations in the same
location as the defendant are more in favor of the defendants
than those organized by medical associations from a different
location from the defendant. By contrast, expert opinions of FA-
MNA did not show local protectionism in this study.
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Table 8: Causal Contribution in MA-MNAs by the
Same/Different Location of Medical Associations and Defend-
ants
Same Different Cases Chi-Square
None 253 34.10% 66 21.93% 319 21.59***
Slight 99 13.34% 36 11.96% 135
Secondary 139 18.73% 85 28.24% 224
Equal 59 7.95% 27 8.97% 86
Primary 163 21.97% 70 23.26% 233
Full 29 3.91% 17 5.65% 46
Total 742 100.00% 301 100.00% 1043
Missing 155
Sources: Author.
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Figure 3: Causal Contribution in MA-MNAs by the
Same/Different Location of Medical Associations and Defend-
ants
Sources: Author.
253
99
139
59
163
29
66
36
85
27
70
17
34.10%
13.34%
18.73%
7.95%
21.97%
3.91%
21.93%
11.96%
28.24%
8.97%
23.26%
5.65%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
None Slight Secondary Equal Primary Full
Same Different Same Different
2019] How Much Do Expert Opinions Matter? 173
Figure 4: Causal Contribution in FA-MNAs by the
Same/Different Location of Forensic Authentication Agencies
and Defendants
Sources: Author.
Table 9 is concerned with expert opinions of MA-MNA on the
four issues regarding medical negligence liability (that is, fault,
causation, causal contribution, and injury degree) by the level
of medical associations: municipal, provincial, and national.
Because the number of MA-MNA at the national level is too
small, the author only compared expert opinions of MA-MNA
conducted at municipal and provincial levels. As Table 9 shows,
79.30% of the municipal-level MA-MNAs found fault, which is
lower than the 86.52% of the provincial-level MA-MNAs that
found fault. The difference is significant (chi-square = 10.51, p
< 0.05).
Turning to the issue of causal contribution, 45.39% of the
municipal-level MA-MNAs found either “no contribution” or
“slight contribution” compared to 39.95% of provincial-level
MA-MNAs. 24.75% of the municipal-level MA-MNAs found ei-
ther “secondary contribution” or “equal contribution,” compared
to 38.97% of provincial-level MA-MNAs, although 29.87% of
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municipal-level MA-MNAs found “primary contribution” and
“full contribution” compared to 21.08% of provincial-level MA-
MNAs. The difference regarding the issue of causation and the
issue of injury degree by the level of MA-MNA is found to be
not significant. The findings primarily support the hypothesis
that expert opinions of the municipal-level MA-MNA are more
in favor of the defendant²medical care providers than those of
the provincial-level MA-MNA.
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Table 9: Expert Opinions on the Four Issues of Medical Negli-
gence Liability by the Level of MA-MNA
Municipal Provincial National Cases Chi-Square
Fault 10.51**
No
147 20.70% 57 13.48% 0 0.00% 204
Yes
563 79.30% 366 86.52% 5 100.00% 934
Total
710 100.00% 423 100.00% 5 100.00% 1138
Missing
60
Causation
3.59
No
220 31.61% 118 28.23% 0 0.00% 338
Yes
476 68.39% 300 71.77% 5 100.00% 781
Total
696 100.00% 418 100.00% 5 100.00% 1119
Missing
79
Causal contribution
33.08***
None
220 32.21% 116 28.43% 0 0.00% 336
Slight
90 13.18% 47 11.52% 1 20.00% 138
Secondary
121 17.72% 114 27.94% 2 40.00% 237
Equal
48 7.03% 45 11.03% 1 20.00% 94
Primary
164 24.01% 77 18.87% 1 20.00% 242
Full
40 5.86% 9 2.21% 0 0.00% 49
Total
683 100.00% 408 100.00% 5 100.00% 1096
Missing
102
Personal injury
10.85
None
186 28.93% 90 23.94% 1 20.00% 277
Level 8-10
92 14.31% 41 10.90% 0 0.00% 133
Level 5-7
41 6.38% 25 6.65% 0 0.00% 66
Level 1-4
40 6.22% 27 7.18% 1 20.00% 68
Death
284 44.17% 193 51.33% 3 60.00% 480
Total
643 100.00% 376 100.00% 5 100.00% 1024
Missing
174
Sources: Author.
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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D. Judicial Deference
Of the 3,409 MNAs with the information about initiators in
the DAD database, 10% of them were not admitted by the
courts. Table 10 shows the non-admission rate by the form of
medical negligence authentication and the type of initiators. In
total, 6.69% of FA-MNA were not admitted by courts, much less
than the 17.93% of MA-MNA that were not admitted by courts.
The non-admission rate of FA-MNA reduced downward accord-
ing to the type of initiators: from the plaintiff-initiated FA-
MNAs (44.57%), the defendant-initiated ones (15.15%), the
jointly-initiated ones (5.15%), to the court-initiated ones
(3.44%). The difference is significant by the types of initiators
(chi-square = 444.09, p < 0.001). By contrast, the non-
admission rate of MA-MNA generally keeps steady among the
different type of initiators, although it is highest (24.53%) for
the defendant-initiated MA-MNAs.
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Of the 3,127 medical negligence cases with expert opinions
and information on the form of medical negligence authentica-
tion, courts further excluded expert opinions in eight cases:
three of them due to incomplete expert opinions, and the others
due to unreliable medical records used in medical negligence
authentication. Of the 3,119 medical negligence cases with ad-
mitted expert opinions given through MNA, Table 11 shows
that courts followed expert opinions regarding the fault issue in
98.97% of cases, expert opinions regarding the causation issue
in 98.07% of cases, expert opinions regarding the causal contri-
bution issue in 93.71% of cases, and expert opinions regarding
the degree of severity of personal injury issue in 99.87% of cas-
es. Table 11 also shows that the form of medical negligence au-
thentication made no substantial difference in terms of judicial
deference to expert opinions, although courts had a slightly
higher acceptance rate for expert opinions of FA-MNA regard-
ing each legal issue than those of MA-MNA. The findings
therefore support the hypothesis that judges present high judi-
cial deference to expert opinions in medical negligence litiga-
tion. The degree of judicial deference, however, is so high that
it exceeded expectations.
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Table 11: Courts’ Attitudes on Expert Opinions by the Form of
MNA
FA-MNA MA-MNA Cases Chi-square
Fault 2.907
Disagree 17 0.75% 15 1.78% 32
Agree 2259 99.25% 828 98.22% 3087
Total 2276 100.00% 843 100.00% 3119
Causation 2.907
Disagree 38 1.67% 22 2.62% 60
Agree 2237 98.33% 819 97.38% 3056
Total 2275 100.00% 841 100.00% 3116
Causal contribution 0.118
Disagree 141 6.20% 55 6.54% 196
Agree 2132 93.80% 786 93.46% 2918
Total 2273 100.00% 841 100.00% 3114
Personal injury 0.3
Disagree 2 0.09% 2 0.24% 3115
Agree 2275 99.91% 840 99.76% 4
Total 2277 100.00% 842 100.00% 3119
Sources: Author.
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Based upon the empirical findings presented and a survey of
judges with experience in adjudicating medical negligence cas-
es, this part of the article further analyzes the social, legal, and
institutional factors that contribute to selection bias, adversar-
ial bias, and judicial deference to expert opinions in the Chi-
nese medical negligence litigation setting. Before developing
the analysis, the reasons for why plaintiff-patients choose liti-
gation to solve medical negligence disputes are briefly dis-
cussed.
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A. Why Litigation?
The courtroom is not the common battlefield for medical neg-
ligence disputes in China;
85
most of these are solved through
“medical people’s mediation.”
86
Moreover, not all medical negli-
gence cases filed in courts end with a judgment; a large propor-
tion of cases
87
end by the withdrawal of the parties
88
or “judi-
cial mediation.”
89
This study found that the winning rate of the
plaintiff in medical negligence litigation is 88.96% in first-
instance cases, 80.75% in appeal cases, and 93.85% in retrial
cases. It also found that the plaintiffs who won the case were
awarded compensation of more than half of the claimed
amount in 40.22% of first-instance cases, 25.67% of appeal cas-
es, and 26.15% of retrial cases. This demonstrates the likeli-
hood and extent of success for plaintiffs in medical negligence
cases if they make persistent efforts to undergo the costly pro-
ceedings of medical negligence litigation. Comparatively, the
winning rate of plaintiffs in medical negligence litigation is
close to that of medical people’s mediation. Damages awards,
however, are generally larger in amount than compensation for
damages agreed by the parties through medical people’s media-
tion. The average amount of a damages award found in this
study was RMB 175,634, and the highest was RMB 3,581,711,
while the average amount of compensation for damage in the
85. Chunyan Ding, A Dose to Cure “Medical Chaos:” Medical Mediation in
China, 10 J. COMP. L. 158, 160 (2015).
86. Yiliao Jiufen Renmin Tiaojie (医疗纠纷人民调解) [medical people’s me-
diation]. Medical people’s mediation is a unique form of community-based
dispute resolution organized by local people’s mediation committee to solve
medical disputes by experienced folk mediators. Since 2010, the Chinese gov-
ernment has enthusiastically promoted medical people’s mediation in China.
See Guanyu Jiajiang Yiliao Jiufen Renmin Tiaojie Gongzuo De Yijian (关于加
强医疗纠纷人民调解工作的意见) [Opinions on Strengthening the Work of Med-
ical People’s Mediation] (promulgated by the Ministry of Just., the Ministry
of Health and the Ins. Reg. Comm., Jan. 8, 2010, effective Jan. 8, 2010).
87. GUANGZHOU YILIAO JIUFEN SUSONG QINGKUANG BAIPISHU (广州医疗纠纷
诉讼情况白皮书) [WHITE BOOK ON LITIGATION OF MEDICAL DISPUTES] (2015),
Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Ct.; 2015-2017 YILIAO SUNHAI ZEREN
JIUFEN ANJIAN SHENPAN BAIPISHU (2015-2017医疗损害责任纠纷案件审判白皮书
) [WHITE BOOK ON ADJUDICATION OF MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY CASES],
(2018), Shanghai Huang Dist. People’s Ct.
88. See Civil Procedure Law, art. 145.
89. Sifa Tiaojie (司法调解) [Judicial mediation], see Liming Wang, Charac-
teristics of China’s Judicial Mediation System, 17 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 67, 67
(2009).
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practice of medical people’s mediation was reported at RMB
57,166.
90
This may help explain why plaintiffs persist in litiga-
tion but not medical people’s mediation in seeking much higher
monetary remedies when they have a strong case, despite the
time, financial, and psychological costs of litigation.
B. Selection Bias
The selection bias of the plaintiff-patients and that of the de-
fendant²medical care providers are evident in this study. Alt-
hough MA-MNA is an optional form of authentication with
competent medical experts, the public has doubted their neu-
trality because of professional protectionism and local protec-
tionism ever since its predecessor, “medical malpractice tech-
nical authentication,”
91
was introduced into law in 1987.
92
This
study confirms the public distrust of MA-MNA in the strong
preference of the plaintiff-patients for FA-MNA. In contrast,
the defendant²medical care providers, who may not deny the
criticisms about the lack of neutrality of MA-MNA,
93
highly
doubt the competence of medical experts of FA-MNA.
94
This
helps explain why the defendants in this study demonstrated
an even stronger preference for MA-MNA than the plaintiffs’
preference for FA-MNA.
This study also demonstrates the very strong selection bias of
courts when they initiated medical negligence authentication
in medical negligence litigation. Excluding the courts of Jiang-
su Province and Shanghai because they are not free to select,
90. Chunyan Ding, Negotiations and Settlement of Medical Disputes and
Insurance Involvement: A Case of Ningbo (working paper, 2019) (on file with
the author).
91. Yiliao Shigu Jishu Jianding (医疗事故技术鉴定) [Medical malpractice
technical authentication].
92. See Yiliao Shigu Chuli Banfa (医疗事故处理办法) [Measures for Han-
dling Med. Malpractice Cases] (promulgated by the State Council, June 29,
1987, effective June 29, 1987, abolished in 2002) St. Council., chapter 4.
93. Gao Feng, Qiantan Yixuehui Yiliao Sunhai Jianding Zhuanjia Chut-
ing Zuozheng (浅淡医学会医疗损害鉴定专家出庭作证) [Discussion on Presence
in Court of Medical Experts of Medical Negligence Authentication Organized
by Medical Associations], ZHONGGUO WEISHENG FAZHI (中国卫生法制) [CHINA
HEAL. LEGIS. SYS.] 61, 62 (2014).
94. Liu Xin & Ma Qianhui, Yiliao Sunhai Jianding Mianlin De Tiaozhan
Yu Duice (医疗损害鉴定面临的挑战与对策) [Challenges and Countermeasures
of Medical Negligence Authentication], 33 ZHONGGUO FAYIXUE ZAZHI (中国法医
学杂志) [CHINESE J. FORENSIC SCI.] 1, 3 (2018).
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the findings show that courts overall chose FA-MNA in 88.08%
of cases and chose FA-MNA in 71.19% of re-authentication cas-
es. The survey of judges revealed that two institutional and
practical factors have contributed to the court’s selection pref-
erence for FA-MNA.
First, the lower courts in China have their local lists of medi-
cal negligence authentication institutions for judges to properly
appoint medical experts when they initiate medical negligence
authentication in medical negligence litigation. Two respond-
ent senior judges stated that medical experts of MA-MNA nor-
mally have rich clinical experience and are capable of giving
expert opinions, while the competence of medical experts of FA-
MNA varies significantly. For the purpose of quality control,
lower courts selectively include in their local lists some forensic
authentication agencies with quality experts and good market
reputation, as well as local medical associations. The number of
listed medical associations, however, is considerably smaller
than that of listed forensic authentication agencies for two rea-
sons. One is that forensic authentication agencies have signifi-
cantly increased in number in the country in recent years.
95
The other reason is that non-local forensic authentication
agencies can also be listed, while only local medical associa-
tions are listed due to the locality rule. In practice, when courts
initiate medical negligence authentication and the disputing
parties cannot agree on the selection of the authentication in-
stitution, courts will first filter out some listed institutions
based upon the will of each party. The plaintiffs often filter out
some listed medical associations, thus making the available
listed medical associations even fewer. Courts will then ran-
domly select an authentication institution out of the pool that
has been narrowed down by the filtering process. Because there
are more forensic authentication agencies than medical associ-
ations in the pool, the former is more likely to be chosen than
the latter in the random selection, which may result in the
courts’ apparent selection preference for FA-MNA.
Second, although all respondent judges expressed that they
do not have personal selection bias, they admitted that medical
associations have institutional disadvantages compared to fo-
95. Hou Jia, Woguo Sifa Jianding Jigou De Shichanghua Fazhan Yanjiu (
我国司法鉴定机构的市场化发展研究) [Study on the Marketized Development of
Forensic Authentication Agencies in China], FAZHI YU JINGJI (法治与经济)
[LEGAL SYST. ECON.] 100, 101 (2017).
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rensic authentication agencies. Medical associations, as quasi-
governmental organs, are often bureaucratic, less efficient, and
generally charge a lower authentication fee than forensic au-
thentication agencies. Moreover, medical experts of MA-MNA
often refuse when they are called to present themselves in
court and answer questions under cross-examination,
96
while
medical experts of FA-MNA are relatively more willing to fol-
low a court order.
97
Additionally, four respondent judges pointed out that the
public generally distrust MA-MNA because of professional pro-
tectionism and local protectionism. One senior judge expressed
that he is inclined to appoint medical experts from a different
province to conduct medical negligence authentication when a
case requires medical experts specializing in a particular area
of medicine but there is a small circle of medical specialists
within the defendant’s province. In that situation, only FA-
MNA can be considered for selection because, unlike MA-MNA,
FA-MNA is not subject to the locality rule. Given these disad-
vantages of MA-MNA, courts have become more hesitant to in-
clude medical associations in the local lists of medical negli-
gence authentication institutions. For example, one respondent
judge explained that the local list of the city of Guangzhou in-
cludes no medical association for both first-time authentication
and re-authentication. On the list, two-fifths of the listed insti-
tutions for first-time authentication and two-thirds of the listed
institutions for re-authentication were non-local forensic au-
thentication agencies. Therefore, selection bias of courts
against MA-MNA partially results from its institutional disad-
vantages.
C. Adversarial Bias
The adversarial bias of the two forms of medical negligence
authentication is also evident in this study. Expert opinions of
MA-MNA found fault and causation in a smaller percentage of
cases, and found the plaintiff suffers “no injury” in a greater
percentage of cases than those of FA-MNA. The factor of causal
contribution involves a relatively discretionary decision by
96. Gao, supra note 93, at 62; Liu & Ma, supra note 94, at 3.
97. 2015-2017 YILIAO SUNHAI ZEREN JIUFEN ANJIAN SHENPAN BAIPISHU
(2015-2017医疗损害责任纠纷案件审判白皮书) [WHITE BOOK ON ADJUDICATION
OFMEDICALNEGLIGENCE LIABILITY CASES], supra note 87.
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medical experts
98
and has a significant impact on the defend-
ant’s contribution to the plaintiff’s damages, as well as the ul-
timate amount of the damages awarded. Expert opinions of
MA-MNA found “secondary contribution,” “equal contribution,”
and “primary contribution” in a much lower percentage of cases
than those of FA-MNA, thus significantly restricting the extent
of medical negligence liability when the fault and causation re-
quirements have already been satisfied. The selection bias of
the parties is merely based upon their subjective perception
and speculation that two forms of medical negligence authenti-
cation have adversarial bias. This study’s findings on the ad-
versarial bias of MA-MNA and FA-MNA, however, provide em-
pirical evidence to justify both the public’s dislike of MA-MNA
and the medical professionals’ dislike of FA-MNA.
The verified adversarial bias of the two forms of medical neg-
ligence authentication will further reinforce the selection bias
of the parties for medical negligence disputes, as well as the
public perception about the differences between MA-MNA and
FA-MNA in terms of the neutrality of the medical experts. Alt-
hough the uniform medical negligence authentication mecha-
nism legally treats the two forms as equal options for medical
negligence authentication, the dichotomy between MA-MNA
and FA-MNA in the mind of the public and medical profession-
als is rooted in medical negligence litigation, as well as other
medical dispute resolutions. This may further harm the pa-
tient-physician relationship
99
and make the parties to medical
negligent disputes more adversarial in China. This study also
suggests that Chinese patients value the neutrality and trust-
worthiness of experts more than their competence, which sup-
ports Tyler’s legitimacy theory that procedural justice concerns,
including concerns about the neutrality of decisionmaker, are
central to the legitimacy of decisions.
100
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The adversarial bias of expert opinions of MA-MNA can be
explained from two perspectives. From an individual perspec-
tive, medical experts of MA-MNA are always medical practi-
tioners working in local medical institutions because of the lo-
cality rule. They fully understand the various implications of
medical negligence liability to the defendant²medical care pro-
viders and their medical staff, such as the negative impact on
hospital accreditation and reputation, the career development
of individual physicians,
101
and the financial burdens that their
employers may request them to bear due to the hospital’s in-
ternal recourse mechanism.
102
This study shows that the de-
fendants in 54.6% of medical negligence lawsuits are third-
level public hospitals, where quality local medical practitioners
generally work.
103
At the same time, these quality medical
practitioners often serve as medical experts in MA-MNA orga-
nized by the local medical associations. It is highly likely that
they personally know and sympathize with the alleged negli-
gent physicians involved in the medical negligence cases for
which they need to provide expert opinions. This is especially
true when medical negligence cases require medical experts
specializing in a particular area of medicine, which means that
medical experts of MA-MNA and the alleged negligent physi-
cians inhabit an extremely small “circle of acquaintance.”
104
Although the plaintiffs are entitled to request the recusal of an
expert in theory,
105
in practice it is difficult for them to know or
prove such subtle personal connections between medical ex-
perts and alleged negligent physicians. Also, medical experts
are likely to treat their peers leniently in the hope that they
will be treated by their peers the same if they are sued by a pa-
tient for medical negligence liability in the future.
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From an institutional perspective, medical institutions and
local medical associations have a close connection as both are
under the direct supervision of the local health bureau. Under
Chinese law, medical institutions need to bear vicarious liabil-
ity for the medical negligence of their staff and be the defend-
ants in medical negligence litigation.
106
Therefore, a medical
institution where the alleged negligent physician works has
great interest in medical negligence cases. As this study shows,
most of the defendants in medical negligence litigation were
third-level and second-level public hospitals. They are directly
supervised and regulated by the local health care bureau,
which is the public authority that not only supervises the local
medical care practice, but also voices and safeguards the inter-
ests of public hospitals.
107
On the other hand, although a local
medical association is a self-regulatory body of medical profes-
sionals and nominally separate from the local government, it is
in effect a quasi-governmental organization.
108
This is because
it remains affiliated to, and supervised by, the local health bu-
reau, wholly or partially receives financial support from it, and
has personnel connections with the local government.
109
D. Judicial Deference
Courts are supposed to examine both the relevance and relia-
bility, as well as the scientific merit of expert opinions before
using them to determine a case. In Chinese medical negligence
litigation, courts at the first stage examine the relevance and
reliability of medical opinions in determining whether to grant
leave to re-authentication. Article 27 of Provisions on Evidence
in Civil Procedures sets out four statutory grounds for re-
authentication: (1) unqualified authentication institution or
authenticator; (2) serious procedural violation in the authenti-
cation process; (3) ungrounded conclusion; and (4) other cir-
cumstances where the authentication conclusion cannot be ad-
mitted after the cross-examination.
110
The respondent judges all confirmed that they decided
whether to approve re-authentication by complying with this
106. See Tort Liability Law, art. 54.
107. Wang, supra note 104, at 1.
108. Ding, supra note 45, at 155.
109. Lin, supra note 45, at 199.
110. See Provisions on Evidence in Civil Procedures, art. 27.
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provision. In practice, the major grounds for re-authentication
are “procedural violation in the authentication process” and
“unreliable medical records used to make authentication con-
clusions.”
111
This study finds that a much higher percentage of
MA-MNAs were not admitted by courts compared to FA-MNAs
(17.93% versus 6.69%), especially when MA-MNA was initiated
by the defendant²medical care providers. This implies that
MA-MNAs more often commit procedural violations and use
unreliable medical records in the process of authentication. Be-
cause the type of initiators does not make a substantial differ-
ence in non-admitted MA-MNAs, it may be inferred that medi-
cal associations encounter institutional management problems
in supervising the process of MA-MNA in accordance with the
procedural requirements and in ensuring expert opinions are
made based upon reliable case materials.
By contrast, in this study, the type of initiators made a dif-
ference in not-admitted medical opinions of FA-MNAs; the non-
admission rate decreased in a downward trajectory from the
plaintiff-initiated FA-MNAs, the defendant-initiated ones, the
jointly-initiated ones, to the court-initiated ones. As noted
above, there are a large number of forensic authentication
agencies in the market, and their competence and quality vary
significantly. The decreasing non-admission rates of FA-MNA
by the type of initiators may be explained as follows: First,
courts, as repeat players,
112
are in an advantageous position in
terms of selecting FA-MNA capable of providing good quality
expert opinions. As such, the non-admission rate of the court-
initiated FA-MNA is the lowest. Second, in the case of jointly-
initiated FA-MNA, as the two disputing parties often bargain
for a forensic authentication agency acceptable to both of them,
they are more likely to conduct research into the competence of
forensic authentication agencies available on the market and
reach a consensus over a fairly good one. Therefore, the non-
admission rate of the jointly-initiated FA-MNA is the second
lowest. Third, the defendant²medical care providers have rela-
tively more experience than the plaintiff-patients in selecting a
quality FA-MNA. The defendants are also less sensitive to the
111. GUANGZHOU YILIAO JIUFEN SUSONG QINGKUANG BAIPISHU (广州医疗纠纷
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cost of the authentication fee than the plaintiff-patients when
the price normally influences the competence of experts. This
helps explain why the non-admission rate of the plaintiff-
initiated FA-MNA is the highest, and that of the defendant-
initiated FA-MNA is the second highest.
At the second stage, courts examine the scientific merit of
medical opinions after admitting them. This study shows that
courts followed expert opinions in terms of the fault, causation,
and degree of personal injury issues in more than 98% of cases,
and the form of medical negligence authentication did not
make a substantial difference. Courts followed expert opinions
regarding the issue of causal contribution in 93.71% of cases
because this issue involves some discretion, and judges are
more comfortable making modifications compared to the other
three issues. All respondent judges surveyed confirmed that
such high rates of judicial acceptance of expert opinions are
consistent with their adjudication experiences. In deciding
medical negligence cases, the judges usually approve expert
opinions on fault, causation, and injury degree, and sometimes
make a modest modification to the value of causal contribution.
The respondent judges surveyed also provided three major
reasons for judicial deference to medical opinions in Chinese
medical negligence litigation. First, the vast majority of judges
do not have sufficient medical knowledge or experience in judg-
ing the scientific merit of expert opinions, and there is no bet-
ter alternative to assist them in making decisions in medical
negligence litigation. Although individual partisan experts may
be invited by the parties to question or supplement expert opin-
ions given through medical negligence authentication, this sel-
dom happens when medical negligence authentication has been
conducted. Second, only a small percentage of medical experts
are successfully called and questioned by the court and the par-
ties under cross-examination.
113
It is difficult for judges to
evaluate the scientific merit of medical opinions without cross-
examination. Third, judges have their own concerns about the
risk of appeal or the risk of being complained about by parties
if they change expert opinions given through medical negli-
gence authentication, especially when parties have already un-
113. Sun Fanfan, et al., Lun Woguo Yiliao Sunhai Jianding Yijian
Zhizheng Chengxu (论我国医疗损害鉴定意见质证程序) [On Cross-Examination
Procedure of Opinions of Medical Negligence Athentication], 29 YIXUE YU
SHEHUI (医学与社会) [MED. & SOC.] 63, 64 (2016).
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dergone the costly “battle of the experts” through the process of
re-authentication. Judges’ deference to expert opinions meets
their personal interests in the Chinese court setting.
114
Only
one respondent judge mentioned that legal judgment concern-
ing the fault issue and the causation issue should be different
from medical judgment. He said that, as a judge, he sometimes
scrutinizes medical opinions to see whether they are capable of
withstanding logical analysis, which shares a similarity with
the Bolitho test concerning judicial deference to medical opin-
ions under English law.
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Based upon a large set of DAD database, supplemented by a
small survey of judges, this article has explored the operation
and role of expert opinions in Chinese medical negligence liti-
gation, finding that the plaintiff-patients won in the vast ma-
jority of cases and were awarded more than half of the claimed
amount in two-fifths of cases. Indeed, the practical determi-
nants of litigation outcomes lie in expert opinions that courts
have admitted and used for the resolution of medical negli-
gence disputes because courts display very strong judicial def-
erence to medical opinions. Courts only work as gatekeepers to
exclude unreliable or irrelevant expert opinions when deciding
whether to grant leave to re-authentication, while medical ex-
perts are the de facto decision-makers in deciding both tech-
nical and legal issues regarding medical negligence liability.
Under the uniform medical negligence authentication mecha-
nism, established after China’s 2009 reform of medical negli-
gence law, MA-MNA and FA-MNA are treated equally in terms
of the application, scope, and legal status. These empirical find-
114. See also Ji Li, The Power Logic of Justice in China, 65 AM. J. COMP. L.
95, 120 (2017).
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can be departed from if that expert opinion is determined by the court to be
not capable of withstanding logical analysis. In other words, the Bolitho test
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ings, however, demonstrate a strong selection bias of plaintiffs
against MA-MNA, and a strong selection bias of defendants
against FA-MNA. The dichotomy of the two forms is rooted in
the perception of patients as well as medical professionals.
This study’s findings also support the institutional adversar-
ial bias of FA-MNA in favor of the plaintiffs, and that of MA-
MNA in favor of the defendants, due to the personal and insti-
tutional connections of medical experts of MA-MNA with the
defendant²medical care providers. Professional protectionism
and local protectionism of MA-MNA are real, but these are not
the same findings for FA-MNA. Furthermore, this study finds
that courts also have a strong preference bias against MA-
MNA when they initiate medical negligence authentication for
a variety of reasons, including the institutional adversarial bi-
as of MA-MNA, bureaucratic inertia, and inefficiency of medi-
cal associations, as well as the unwillingness of their medical
experts to present themselves in court for cross-examination.
This study found that four-fifths of medical negligence authen-
tications are initiated by courts and 7% by the plaintiffs; FA-
MNA has become the dominant form to deliver expert opinions
in medical negligence litigation.
These findings have useful implications for the ongoing re-
form of China’s medical negligence authentication mechanism.
In October 2018, the National Health Commission and the
Ministry of Justice jointly published the draft Regulatory
Measures on Medical Negligence Authentication (For Public
Consultation).
116
The Draft sets out a number of proposals: (1) a
“common list of medical experts” for MA-MNA and FA-MNA,
which will be jointly established by the two bureaus of health
care and justice under the administration of the former (Arti-
cles 9 and 10); (2) the principle of “specialist peer review,”
117
which means that neither forensic experts can provide expert
opinions regarding clinical medicine, nor medical specialists in
one area of medicine can offer expert opinions regarding other
areas of medicine (Article 3); and (3) the locality rule applied to
the listing of medical experts of medical associations as well as
116. Notice of the National Health Commission and the Ministry of Justice
on Public Consultation of the Regulatory Measures on Medical Negligence
Authentication (For Public Consultation), supra note 23.
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the selection of a medical negligence authentication institution
and medical experts in individual cases.
118
When keeping the locality rule, the Draft furthermore at-
tempts to prevent forensic experts from providing expert opin-
ions on clinical medicine, thus weakening the role of FA-MNA
in the practice of medical negligence authentication. This re-
sults in voicing the interests of medical professionals and medi-
cal institutions, but not those of patients.
119
Based upon this
study’s empirical evidence on professional protectionism and
local protectionism of medical experts of MA-MNA, however,
the Draft is unlikely to help change the public perception of
MA-MNA to win the public’s support for its proposed medical
negligence authentication mechanism reform because it not
only fails to address, but also aggravates, the problems of pro-
fessional protectionism and local protectionism. As a result, it
thus worsens the lack of neutrality of MA-MNA. This article
suggests that reform of the medical negligence authentication
mechanism must face these fundamental problems in the cur-
rent practice of medical negligence authentication and provide
effective solutions to restore the public trust in MA-MNA. The
most pressing is to abolish the locality rule.
120
This study further provides food for thought on judicial defer-
ence to medical opinions and the proper roles of courts in medi-
cal negligence litigation. In light of their lack of medical
knowledge and experience, Chinese judges seem too reluctant
to exercise their judicial power in scrutinizing the scientific
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merit of expert opinions in medical negligence cases. As a re-
sult, the medical judgment dominates the decision-making pro-
cess when judges surrender their judicial power to medical ex-
perts, allowing them to become the de facto adjudicators in
medical negligence litigation. This article suggests that courts
have a responsibility to examine the scientific merit of medical
opinions through logical analysis, which is a defined skill of le-
gal professionals. Moreover, courts should strictly implement
the requirement that experts offering opinions be called to the
court and questioned under cross-examination. Moreover,
courts need to effectively make use of the existing procedural
rule regarding individual partisan experts to assist them in
evaluating the scientific quality of expert opinions in medical
negligence litigation.
